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THE PLAINTIFF’S PLIGHT:
ALTERING ALASKA’S RULE 82 TO
BETTER COMPENSATE PLAINTIFFS
Matthew Naiman*
ABSTRACT
Alaska is unique among the fifty states in its use of a version of the English
rule of attorneys’ fees in civil cases. Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82, in
combination with several other rules, effectuates a fee shift such that the losing
party pays a portion of the winning party’s attorneys’ fees. Rule 82 has two fee
schedules: one for monetary judgments and one for non-monetary judgments.
The monetary judgment fee awards are based in part on the amount of the
judgment, while the non-monetary judgment fee awards are based on the
victorious party’s actual, reasonable attorneys’ fees. This difference in the way
fee awards are calculated creates a disparity between plaintiffs, who seek
damages, and defendants, who seek dismissal. While previous scholarship has
noted this disparity, no commentator has proposed and defended a solution.
This Note examines the English and American Rules historically and through
a law and economics framework. It then analyzes Rule 82 and its companion
rules. Ultimately, this Note concludes that the Alaska Supreme Court or the
Alaska State Legislature should alter Rule 82 to create better parity between
plaintiffs and defendants and cap the amount of fees that can be exacted from a
defeated party.

I. INTRODUCTION
“The fundamental principle of damages is to restore the injured
party, as nearly as possible, to the position he would have been in had it
not been for the wrong of the other party.”1 “Fundamental” as this
Copyright © 2022 by Matthew Naiman.
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2022; D.Phil., University of
Oxford, 2018; B.A., Franklin and Marshall College, 2012. Many thanks to Professor
Rebecca Rich and my colleagues in her Scholarly Writing Workshop whose
feedback and direction helped shape this Note. I would also like to thank the staff
of Alaska Law Review, especially Angela Sbano and Savannah Artusi, for their keen
editing, clarifying suggestions, and general assistance in making this Note
publication ready. Finally, thank you to my partner Lauren Johnson for her
support and guidance even though she finds my work “beyond boring.”
1. United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958). For an
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principle may be, most states do not follow it; generally, most states do
not award attorneys’ fees to victorious plaintiffs.2 Consider a motorist,
who—after a car accident, a hospital stay, and a year of litigation3—is
awarded $20,000 for damage to her car, $70,000 for her medical bills, and
$10,000 for her pain and suffering, for a total of $100,000 in damages.4
Does she receive the $100,000 the jury awarded?
Unfortunately for our motorist, she agreed to a one-third
contingency arrangement with her lawyer.5 Of the $100,000 the jury
awarded, she will only receive two-thirds. As such, she is $33,333.33
worse off than she was prior to the accident. This approach, used
throughout most of the country, is known as the American Rule: parties
to litigation each pay their own attorneys’ fees.6
Unlike the rest of the United States, Alaska follows a version of the
English Rule.7 Under the pure version of this rule, the losing party pays
both its own attorneys’ fees as well as those of the victorious party.8
Alaska, however, does not follow the pure English Rule;9 under Alaska
Rule of Civil Procedure 82 (“Rule 82”), victorious parties are only eligible
to receive a portion of their attorneys’ fees from the losing party.10

Alaskan case acknowledging this rule, see Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 670–71
(Alaska 1967).
2. Douglas Rennie, Rule 82 & Tort Reform: An Empirical Study of the Impact of
Alaska’s English Rule on Federal Civil Case Filings, 29 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2012)
(citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975)).
3. Median time to disposition in federal court presiding on state law issues
in Alaska is ten months. Id. at 38 chart 4, 49 tbl.6.
4. This hypothetical does not consider expert fees or negotiation with
insurance providers.
5. Alaska’s Rules of Professional Conduct permit contingency fees in civil
cases so long as they are not unreasonable. ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.5.
The typical contingency fee in Alaska is one-third, but the reasonableness of this
fee is dependent on a number of factors. How to Select a Lawyer, ALASKA BAR ASS’N,
https://alaskabar.org/for-the-public/how-to-select-a-lawyer/ (last visited Dec.
15, 2021).
6. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 247; see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK & RICHARD
HASEN, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 923–24 (5th ed. 2019) (laying out the
American Rule).
7. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82 (defining Alaska’s rule for attorneys’ fees). See
also LAYCOCK & HASEN, supra note 6, at 925, for a brief explanation of Alaska’s
rule.
8. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The English Versus the American
Rule on Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL
L. REV. 327, 329 (2013); see also Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with
Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 44–47 (1984) (discussing fee
shifting in European jurisdictions).
9. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82 (setting out the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded
to recovering parties).
10. In the above hypothetical, the defeated defendants would pay $12,500 of
our motorist’s $33,333.33 attorneys’ fees.
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In Alaska, how attorneys’ fee awards are calculated primarily
depends on whether the prevailing party received a monetary judgment
or a non-monetary judgment.11 When Alaskan courts award monetary
judgments, Rule 82(b)(1) dictates the amount of attorneys’ fees that the
prevailing party will be awarded according to the level of contestation12
and the amount of the judgment.13 Fee awards range from 1% to 20% of
damages awarded in the judgment.14 In instances where the “prevailing
party recovers no monetary judgment,” such as when the defendant
prevails, Rule 82(b)(2) grants a prevailing party 20% or 30% of its actual,
reasonable fees, depending on whether a trial took place.15 In effect, this
split between monetary and non-monetary judgments creates two
versions of Rule 82: one for victorious plaintiffs seeking damages, who
are limited to a maximum of 20% of the judgment amount (with the
percentage decreasing as the judgment amount increases), and a second
for victorious defendants seeking dismissal, who are entitled to either
20% or 30% of their actual, reasonable fees.16 While these two systems are
ostensibly designed to create parity,17 the differences between them cause
a disparity between the fee awards available to prevailing plaintiffs and
prevailing defendants.18
Previous scholarship within this Journal has empirically examined
Rule 82’s usefulness as a tort reform mechanism,19 argued against the
elimination of Rule 82’s public interest exception,20 empirically and
anecdotally studied Rule 82’s operation and use,21 assessed recent
changes to Rule 82,22 analyzed the “economic incentive factor” formerly
11. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82.
12. The three levels of contestation are: the case is uncontested, the case is
contested but did not go to trial, and the case went to trial. See discussion infra
Section III.A.1.
13. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(1).
14. Id.
15. Id. 82(b)(2).
16. See Fee Arrangements, ALASKA PERS. INJ. L. GRP.,
https://www.alaskainjurylawgroup.com/fee-arrangements.html (last visited
Oct. 9, 2021) (highlighting that victorious plaintiffs should expect to recover
roughly ten percent of their attorneys’ fees but defeated plaintiffs may be liable
for thirty percent of a defendant’s reasonable fees).
17. SUSANNE DI PIETRO, TERESA CARNS, & PAMELA KELLEY, ALASKA’S ENGLISH
RULE: ATTORNEY’S FEE SHIFTING IN CIVIL CASES 38–39 (1995) [hereinafter
ATTORNEYS’ FEES 1995].
18. See infra Parts II, III.
19. Rennie, supra note 2.
20. Abizer Zanzi, Note, The Constitutional Battle Over the Public Interest Litigant
Exception to Rule 82, 21 ALASKA L. REV. 329 (2004).
21. Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa Carns, Alaska’s English Rule: Attorney’s Fee
Shifting in Civil Cases, 13 ALASKA L. REV. 33 (1996).
22. Kevin Kordziel, Note, Rule 82 Revisited: Attorney Fee Shifting in Alaska, 10
ALASKA L. REV. 429 (1993).
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associated with public interest litigation,23 and investigated the operation
of the rule at various points in time.24 Much of this scholarship has noted
Rule 82’s shortcomings as a tort reform mechanism and that Alaska’s
litigation metrics do not differ significantly from similarly situated states
despite the state’s fee shifting rules.25 Rather than arguing that the sword
of Rule 82 should be sharpened for use against plaintiffs, this Note
contends that Rule 82 should be bent into a plowshare that more fully
compensates victorious plaintiffs and creates parity with defendants.
Specifically, prevailing parties that receive monetary judgments should
be allowed to calculate their Rule 82 attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the
judgment according to Rule 82(b)(1) or by taking a flat percentage of their
actual attorneys’ fees in accordance with Rule 82(b)(2). Further, to limit
uncertainty, prevent runaway fee awards, incentivize more realistic
pleadings, and encourage low-value, non-frivolous claims, a cap should
be placed on the amount of awardable attorneys’ fees. The cap should be
subject to its own schedule based on the value of the suit as pled.
Because fee shifting alters the incentives of bringing, prosecuting,
and defending suits for both the litigants and their lawyers, Rule 82
reflects the conflicts between equity, economics, and access to the judicial
system. Making the proposed alterations will result in a more equal civil
justice system. Part II of this Note overviews the history of the English
and the American Rules for fee shifting, compares the two rules using a
law and economics framework, and highlights some shortcomings of
assuming plaintiffs are rational. Part III primarily examines Rule 82 and
its companion rules. This Part describes how the modern versions of these
rules function and delves deeper into their mechanics than prior
scholarship has. This Part also summarizes Rule 82’s history and
highlights its purposes to show how and why the rule has, and can be,
changed. Part IV lays out the proposed changes to Rule 82 and argues in
favor of these changes. This Note concludes that Rule 82 should be altered
to create better parity between plaintiffs and defendants and to
presumptively cap fee awards.

II. BACKGROUND
Rule 82’s partial fee shifting sits uneasy atop the mountain of debate
between proponents of the American Rule and proponents of the English

23. Virginia Cella Antipolo, Note, The Impact of Economic Incentives on the
Award of Attorney’s Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 1 ALASKA L. REV. 189 (1984).
24. Gregory Hughes, Comment, Award of Attorney’s Fees in Alaska: An Analysis
of Rule 82, 4 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 129 (1974).
25. E.g., Rennie, supra note 2, at 43; Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 21, at 88.
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Rule.26 Under the American Rule, each party pays its own fees
irrespective of which party ultimately prevails.27 Under the English Rule,
the losing party pays all of the attorneys’ fees associated with the
litigation.28 The rules have advantages and disadvantages in a range of
categories: relative access to justice,29 completeness of remedy,30
incentivization or disincentivization of suit,31 and the improvement of
claim quality,32 among others.33 This Part outlines the divergent histories
of the English and the American Rules, compares the expected value of
suit under each of the two rules using a law and economics framework,
and highlights some issues with this framework to provide background
on Rule 82 and fee shifting generally.
A. Histories of the English Rule and the American Rule
Though not comprehensive, this Section demonstrates the divergent
evolution of the English and the American Rules. Further, it details some
modern abrogations of the American Rule in the United States.34
Throughout the histories of both rules, plaintiffs and defendants have not
26. An exhaustive examination of the contours of this debate is beyond the
scope of this Note.
27. Rennie, supra note 2, at 1–2.
28. In reality, the jurisdictions that make use of the English Rule allow the
victorious party to recover between one-half and two-thirds of attorneys’ fees. See
id. at 5. However, when this Note refers to the English Rule it will typically refer
to a simplified English Rule that grants full fees to the prevailing party.
29. Peter Karsten & Oliver Bateman, Detecting Good Public Policy Rationales for
the American Rule: A Response to the Ill-Conceived Calls for “Loser Pays” Rules, 66
DUKE L.J. 729, 761 (2016). But see John Leubsdorf, Does the American Rule Promote
Access to Justice? Was That Why it Was Adopted?, 67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 257, 257 (2019)
(arguing that the American Rule was not adopted to increase access to courts and
actually does not increase access in some classes of cases).
30. See LAYCOCK & HASEN, supra note 6, at 923–24 (explaining the rightful
position principle and the English Rule).
31. See Marie Gryphon, Assessing the Effects of a “Loser Pays” Rule on the
American Legal System: An Economic Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 8 RUTGERS J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 567, 574 (2011) (noting that the English Rule should decrease
frivolous, low-value suits and nuisance suits); see also Carl Cheng, Important Rights
and the Private Attorney General Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1929, 1929 (1985)
(discussing the private attorney general doctrine and how its purpose is to
incentivize socially useful suit).
32. See James Hughes & Edward Snyder, Litigation and Settlement under the
English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J.L. & ECON. 225, 245 (1995)
(noting that the English Rule may improve claim quality).
33. See, e.g., Gryphon, supra note 31, at 568 (for an argument that the
American Rule imposes costs on businesses that are ultimately passed to
consumers and thus inefficient on a societal level); Walter Olson & David
Bernstein, Loser-Pays: Where Next?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (noting the lack of
consensus among commentators on the effects of the two rules).
34. See infra Part II.
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always been on equal footing, though imbalances usually favor
plaintiffs.35 Ultimately, the development of the American Rule stems from
a fear of excessive attorneys’ fees. The path to the modern versions of
these rules was meandering; the twists reflect policy judgments, shifts in
power, and changes in concepts of fairness.
The English Rule was statutorily imposed in England in 1607.36
However, fee shifting existed in England prior to this statute. Under the
powers of equity, early Chancellors of English courts issued fees to the
prevailing party when the defeated party abused process or acted
indecently.37 In 1278, the Statutes of Gloucester granted victorious
plaintiffs fees in certain actions, and two centuries later defendants were
given limited access to fee shifting.38 Parity between plaintiffs and
defendants came with the 1607 statute,39 but the rule has since evolved
and increased in complexity.40
The English Rule was not available at common law in the United
States, and Americans did not seek to statutorily emulate the complex fee
shifting system of their English counterparts.41 In the seventeenth
century, colonial Americans generally maintained a distrust of attorneys,
a desire to limit their control on society, and a belief that the law was a set
of simple, easily ascertained rules.42 Moroever, in many jurisdictions
attorneys were not allowed to charge for their services.43 By the
eighteenth century, a greater number of statutes allowed attorneys to
charge for their services but limited the fee amount or created fee
schedules.44 In some jurisdictions, statutes limited the amounts that could
be charged to the opposing party, but additional fees could be charged to
the lawyer’s client.45 Following the American Revolution, Congress
35. See generally Susan M. Olson, How Much Access to Justice from State “Equal
Access to Justice Acts”?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 547, 550–53 (1995).
36. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 n.18
(1975).
37. John Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured
Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV., 1567, 1570 (1993).
38. Id. at 1570–71.
39. Id. at 1571.
40. See id. (citing Arthur Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 851–78 (1929))
(noting the system of taxing costs). In the many jurisdictions that utilize a form of
the English Rule, the victorious party is typically entitled to between half and twothirds of its actual attorneys’ fees. Id. at 1599–1600.
41. Rennie, supra note 2, at 4–5.
42. Vargo, supra note 37, at 1571–72.
43. See id. at 1572 (quoting CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR
4 (1913)).
44. Id. at 1572–73.
45. Id. at 1573 n.49 (citing John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American
Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 11–12 (1984)) (illustrating
how lawyers collected fees or “gifts” for charges not mentioned in regulations and
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authorized federal courts to follow state laws regarding attorneys’ fees,
and when this statute lapsed, federal courts continued to borrow from
state law.46 The Supreme Court initially laid out the forerunner to the
American Rule in 179647 but vacillated on its full implementation.48
By the mid-ninteenth century, Congress became worried that
defeated parties bore excessive litigation costs. In the words of Senator
Bradbury, “[C]osts have been swelled to an amount exceedingly
oppressive to suitors, and altogether disproportionate to the magnitude
and importance of the causes in which they are taxed, or the labor
bestowed.”49 In 1853, Congress enacted a fee bill to limit fee recovery to
docket fees capped at twenty dollars.50 This law cemented the American
Rule within federal jurisprudence but left the door open for over 200
federal and nearly 4,000 state statutory exceptions currently in place.51
While numerous, these exceptions are narrower than Alaska’s Rule
82.52 On the federal side, consider 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(k). The former grants attorneys’ fees to those injured by antitrust
violations.53 The latter ordinarily entitles prevailing parties to attorneys’
fees in employment discrimination claims unless the prevailing party is
the United States government.54 Fee shifting in these examples is limited
to specific claims and situations.
Several states, Alaska excepted, have granted fee shifting in similarly
limited circumstances.55 Take, for example, Utah’s Gasoline Products
charged clients more than court would award as costs from losing opponent).
46. Id. at 1575–76.
47. Id. (citing Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796)).
48. See id. at 1575–78 (discussing the Supreme Court decisions on attorneys’
fees between 1796 and 1853).
49. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 252 n.24
(1975) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 207 (1853)).
50. Vargo, supra note 37, at 1578.
51. LAYCOCK & HASEN, supra note 6, at 925.
52. See HENRY COHEN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 94-970, AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES
BY FEDERAL COURTS AND FEDERAL AGENCIES CRS-6 (2008) (noting that
congressionally approved fee shifting is limited to “specific situations”).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
55. See Olson, supra note 35, at 552, 563 (noting that many state fee shifting
statutes are associated with little-used laws and that most state Equal Access to
Justice Acts are limited to certain types of actions against the state). There have
been several incidents where states accidentally enacted the English Rule broadly.
See, e.g., Deborah Cassens Weiss, Oklahoma Unintentionally Adopts Loser-Pays
System for Attorney Fees in Civil Cases, A.B.A. J. (May 18, 2017),
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/oklahoma_adopts_loser_pays_fees
_in_civil_cases_as_a_result_of_oversight_by; William W. Savage, III, Back to
Normal: OK Legislature Restores American Rule, NONDOC (May 25, 2017),
https://nondoc.com/2017/05/25/oklahoma-legislature-restores-americanrule/.
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Marketing Act, which provides for a fee shift toward the prevailing party
in certain gasoline refiner-dealer disputes.56 Beyond their narrowness in
scope, the majority of state fee shifting regimes are pro-plaintiff.57
B. Comparing Rules
The battle between proponents of the English and American Rules
has been fought across multiple theaters, but there is still little agreement
between the parties.58 Generally, according to law and economics
scholars, the American Rule seems to encourage litigation by allowing
plaintiffs access to the justice system without excessive risk to their
personal funds.59 That scholars agree on this point does not mean the
American Rule is superior or even that more litigation occurs in
jurisdictions that use the American Rule.60 However, the expected value
of suit is useful in understanding how rational potential plaintiffs act.
After explaining how the design of the American Rule mathematically
encourages suit, this Section highlights how plaintiffs are not necessarily
“rational.”
Imagine a rational plaintiff injured in a convenience store. Our
rational plaintiff incurred $200,000 worth of injury and is paying $20,000
out of pocket for his personal injury attorney.61 The defendant will also
expend $20,000 on counsel. Which system does our rational plaintiff
prefer, and under what circumstances will he bring suit?
Under the American Rule, if the plaintiff wins his suit, he will net
$180,000—the $200,000 award minus the $20,000 attorney fee. Should he
lose, he would net negative $20,000—the cost of his attorney. Because he
is rational, he will bring suit only when his expected judgment—the
probability of victory multiplied by the expected award—meets or

56. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-12-7 (2021).
57. Olson, supra note 35, at 553–54.
58. Olson & Bernstein, supra note 33, at 1164 (noting the lack of consensus
among commentators on the effects of the two rules).
59. See Avery W. Katz & Chris W. Sanchirico, Fee Shifting in Litigation: Survey
and Assessment, 10 U. PA. L. SCH. INST. FOR L. & ECON., no. 30, 2010, at 1, 9 (citing
Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative
Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 58 (1982)) (noting that
the American Rule encourages plaintiffs with large claims but low chances of
victory).
60. See Rennie, supra note 2, at 43 (noting that civil and tort filing rates in
Alaska’s federal courts do not significantly differ from other parts of the United
States).
61. The following hypotheticals do not take into account the emotional or
collateral costs associated with trial, such as time off from work, travel costs, and
child care.
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exceeds the costs of litigation.62 Here, the plaintiff will bring his claim if
the chance of victory is 10% or greater.63
Under the English Rule, if the plaintiff were to win his suit, he would
net $200,000—the amount of the award. Should he lose, he would net
negative $40,000—the cost of the two attorneys. Because he is rational, he
will bring suit only when his expected judgment meets or exceeds his
expected legal costs—the cost of the attorneys multiplied by the
probability of paying that fee.64 Here, the plaintiff will bring his claim if
the chance of victory is 16.67% or greater.65
Thus the American Rule “incentivizes suit.” Assuming the attorneys’
fees of both parties are equal, the value of the putative plaintiff’s suit is
higher under the American Rule than it is under the English Rule when
the chance of victory is below 50%. Once the chance of victory reaches
50%, plaintiffs would prefer the English Rule.

62. Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under
Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 58 (1982).
Shavell expresses this as pw > x where p is the plaintiff’s likelihood of winning, w
is the amount of the judgment, and x is the legal costs. Id. This formulation does
not take into account the plaintiff’s net and only examines when suit will be
brought. To take the net into account, the equation for expected value can be
expressed as p(w – x) – (1 – p)x. When the result is zero, the plaintiff breaks even
from an expected value standpoint. This is the equation that will be used below.
63. p(200,000 – 20,000) – (1 – p)20,000 = 0. Solving for p yields 0.1, which equals
10%.
64. Shavell, supra note 62, at 59. Shavell expresses this as pw > (1 – p)(x + y)
where the terms are the same as above and y is equal to the defendant’s fees. Id.
This formula may also be expressed as pw – ((1 – p)(x + y)). When the result is zero,
the plaintiff breaks even from an expected value standpoint.
65. p(200,000) – ((1 – p)(20,000 + 20,000)) = 0. Solving for p yields 0.16666
repeating, which equals roughly 16.67%.
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Figure 1. Comparison of the expected value of a suit under the American and English
Rules.

The expected value of a suit under the American Rule is shifted
farther in our rational plaintiff’s favor when contingency fees are in play.
Under a contingency fee arrangement, our rational plaintiff has no cost in
the event of a loss.66 Therefore, he would bring suit whenever there is a
non-zero chance of success. Under contingency fee arrangements,
attorneys, rather than clients, internalize the risk and costs associated
with losing the suit. Contingency fee arrangements therefore shift the
rational decision-making process of whether to bring suit from clients to
attorneys. In making their decisions on whether to take a plaintiff’s case,
attorneys must consider their fee in the event of a victory and their
expected costs independent of the outcome of the suit.67 Thus, while
contingency fee arrangements incentivize rational plaintiffs to bring suit,
they shift the decision making process to the plaintiffs’ attorneys, who
will be forced to internalize their own costs in the event of a loss.
The examples above assume a risk-neutral plaintiff—that is, a
rational plaintiff whose decisions are guided by the expected value of

66. This may be expressed as p(w – x) – (1 – p)($0). The second term will
always resolve to zero.
67. This can be represented as p(x – s) – (1 – p)s, where s is the cost to the
attorney of providing legal services.
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litigation but not by the level of uncertainty regarding that valuation.68
However, not all plaintiffs are risk neutral. For non-risk-neutral parties,
the expected value and the uncertainty of receiving that value are at
play.69 For example, a risk-averse plaintiff would rather accept a certain
$1,000 than a 10% chance at $10,000.70 However, a risk-seeking plaintiff
would prefer the 10% chance of $10,000 to the certain $1,000.71 The degree
of risk aversion or risk seeking alters plaintiff behavior.72
Further, the level of uncertainty in the valuation will alter plaintiff
behavior. Take, for example, a plaintiff injured snowmobiling who has a
50% chance of winning and a $10,000 fee irrespective of outcome. Under
the American Rule, the injured snowmobiler will bring suit when the
expected award is greater than or equal to $20,000. But, what if the
accident and the legal outcomes could not be valued with certainty?
Maybe the plaintiff knows that he has imperfect information or is not
good at valuing claims. In other words, there can be uncertainty in the
valuation itself, and this uncertainty has the potential to change how
plaintiffs approach litigation.
Because they are human, neither plaintiffs nor defendants are
perfectly rational, and they are subject to psychological biases such as
endowment and framing effects. The endowment effect is an emotional
bias that can cause overvaluation of owned objects.73 The framing effect
suggests that people are more risk averse when outcomes are positive
than when outcomes are negative. For example, most people would
prefer a guaranteed gain of $1,000 to a one in five chance of gaining $5,000,
but would prefer a one in five chance of losing $5,000 to definitely losing
$1,000.74 Further, people tend to be loss averse and asymmetrically value
equivalent losses and gains.75 Thus, the cost of losing $1,000 outweighs an
equivalent gain.76 These psychological biases affect plaintiff and
defendant decisions.
Furthermore, the hypotheticals above do not take into account the
plaintiff’s financial resources. The Supreme Court noted the potential
effects of the English Rule on the poor, stating that they “might be
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Shavell, supra note 62, at 58.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 58 n.12 (describing a risk-seeking plaintiff).
For a discussion of decision theory, see HOWARD RAIFFA, DECISION
ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1968).
73. CHARLES CRAVER, SKILLS & VALUES: LEGAL NEGOTIATING 157–59 (3d ed.
2016).
74. Id. at 155–56.
75. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: Analysis of Decision
under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 279 (1979).
76. Id.
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unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if
the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents’ counsel.”77
Stated plainly, plaintiffs of limited means may be particularly risk averse
under the English Rule because they stand to lose what little they have.
This problem may sound foreign, but it is American reality. A 2021
survey of Americans suggested that 51% had less than three months of
emergency funds, and about half of that group had no savings at all.78 A
2019 survey suggested that 69% of Americans have less than $1,000 in
savings.79 This is a double-edged sword: on the one hand, defendants may
not be able to collect fees from insolvent plaintiffs; on the other, low and
moderate income loss-averse plaintiffs will not bring meritorious claims,
fearing the economic ramifications of a loss.
Assume our injured plaintiff is better off than most Americans; he is
mostly living paycheck to paycheck but has an emergency fund of
$10,000. He cannot afford to hire one lawyer, let alone two, and is likely
only able to proceed with a case if his lawyer works on contingency.
Unlike someone of moderate or significant means, under the English
Rule, our plaintiff would be financially crippled by a loss.
In some systems that utilize the English Rule, insolvent and nearly
insolvent plaintiffs are given a reprieve from the harsh edge of the twoway fee shift. These systems intentionally grant these plaintiffs one-way
fee shifting and relieve them of liability to victorious defendants.80 In
systems that do not utilize one-way fee shifting, poorer plaintiffs may still
benefit from one-way fee shifting, as they are functionally judgmentproof and would be unable to pay fees levied on them.81 A defendant’s
likely inability to collect does not necessarily negate a plaintiff’s fear of
collection and the accompanying declaration of bankruptcy. Generally,
bringing suit in a fee-shifting jurisdiction may present more of a dilemma
to middle class plaintiffs than it would for the judgment-proof poor or the
wealthy for whom an adverse judgment would not significantly affect
their net worth.82

77. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718
(1967).
78. Francisco Velasquez, Over Half of Americans Have Less than 3 Months Worth
of
Emergency
Savings,
CNBC
(July
28,
2021,
12:02
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/28/51percent-of-americans-have-less-than-3months-worth-of-emergency-savings.html.
79. Cameron Huddleston, Survey: 69% of Americans Have Less Than $1,000 in
Savings, YAHOO! (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.yahoo.com/now/survey-69americans-less-1-171927256.html.
80. Vargo, supra note 37, at 1629.
81. Rennie, supra note 2, at 6 n.29.
82. See Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 21, at 79 (noting that this is the case in
Alaska).
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III. RULE 82 AND ITS COMPANIONS
Alaska’s Rule 82 is the most expansive of the nearly 2,000 state
abrogations of the American Rule, and it has a long history. But it is not
the only mechanism for shifting the financial burden between parties in
Alaska. Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure 79 (“Rule 79”) and 68 (“Rule 68”)
also serve to rebalance the scales of payment. After discussing the current
procedure and functionality of Rule 82 and its companions, this Section
details Alaska’s rationale for these rules and summarizes the history of
Rule 82 to provide a sense of the procedure required to change it.
A. Mechanics of Rule 82
Barring judicial intervention, Rule 82 mandates that the prevailing
party has ten days from the judgment date to bring a motion to recover a
percentage of its attorneys’ fees.83 The defeated party has ten days to file
opposition.84 The prevailing party is the party that is “successful on the
‘main issue’ of the action and ‘in whose favor the decision or verdict is
rendered and the judgment entered.’”85 As such, the prevailing party need
not win every issue.86 The court generally maintains broad discretion over
fees,87 and in the event that more than one party is successful on its main
issue, the court may deny both parties attorneys’ fees.88 On review,
appellate courts utilize the abuse of discretion standard and overturn the
trial court’s ruling only when it is “manifestly unreasonable.”89
Generally, the amount of the award is determined by Rule 82’s fee
schedules,90 except where abrogated by law or the parties’ agreement,91
or when the court determines a modification is warranted.92 When the
prevailing party wins a monetary award, the amount of fees granted
83. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(c).
84. Id. 77(c)(2).
85. Progressive Corp. v. Peter ex rel. Peter, 195 P.3d 1083, 1092 (Alaska 2008)
(emphasis added) (quoting Hillman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 855 P.2d
1321, 1327 (Alaska 1993)).
86. Id. (citing Blumenshine v. Baptiste, 869 P.2d 470, 474 (Alaska 1994)).
87. Id.
88. See Taylor v. Moutrie-Pelham, 246 P.3d 927, 929–30 (Alaska 2011)
(determining that it was not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to conclude
that neither party was the prevailing party when each party won a main issue).
89. Progressive Corp., 195 P.3d at 1092 (citing Interior Cabaret Ass’n v.
Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 135 P.3d 1000, 1002 (Alaska 2006)).
90. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b).
91. Id. 82(a). See, e.g., Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 21, at 73 (discussing posttrial settlements that exchange the right to appeal for the right to Rule 82 fees);
ATTORNEYS’ FEES 1995, supra note 17, at 45–52 (listing situations where Rule 82
does not apply).
92. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(3).
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ranges from 1% to 20% of that award depending on the level of
contestation and the award amount.93 Depending on the need for a trial,
the schedule for non-monetary awards ranges from 20% to 30% of “actual
attorney’s fees which were necessarily incurred.”94 Where default
judgment is entered, the clerk determines fees.95 In all other cases, the
court is the arbiter of fees.96
1. Monetary Judgments
For cases resulting in monetary judgments, the court must first
determine the amount of the judgment.97 Judges determine the amount of
the fee award based on the net, rather than the gross, judgment.98 Thus,
where counterclaims reduce the amount of a judgment, the amount used
to determine the fee award is decreased accordingly.99 In determining the
net judgment, in addition to all forms of monetary judgment,100 courts
consider prejudgment interest.101 As such, the net judgment includes
prejudgment interest, compensatory damages, nominal damages, and
punitive damages less any amount awarded for counterclaims.
After calculating the net judgment, courts calculate the Rule 82 fee
award. The fee schedule is a matrix that has two axes: judgment amount
and contestation.102

93. Id. 82(b)(1).
94. Id. 82(b)(2).
95. Id. 82(d).
96. Id.
97. Id. 82(b).
98. ATTORNEYS’ FEES 1995, supra note 17, at 57 (citing Fairbanks Builders v.
Sandstrom Plumbing & Heating, 555 P.2d 964, 967 (Alaska 1976)). For example, if
a court awarded $11,000 to a plaintiff for her primary claim and $1,000 to a
defendant for his cross claim, the plaintiff’s net judgment would be $10,000.
99. Fairbanks Builders, 555 P.2d at 967.
100. See ATTORNEYS’ FEES 1995, supra note 17, at 57–58, 58 n.293 (citing Sturm,
Ruger, & Co. v. Day, 627 P.2d 204, 205 (Alaska 1981)) (stating that punitive
damages are included because of their relationship to nominal damages). The
article states that punitive damages are permissively included, but this is a slight
misstatement as punitive damages are included by default and permissively
excluded. Sturm, Ruger, & Co., 627 P.2d at 205. Where excluded, the court must state
its reasoning. Id.
101. ATTORNEYS’ FEES 1995, supra note 17, at 57 (citing Era Helicopters v.
Digicon Alaska, 518 P.2d 1057, 1063 (Alaska 1974)).
102. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(1).
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Judgment and, If Awarded,
Prejudgment Interest

Contested
with Trial

First
Next
Next
Over

20%
10%
10%
10%

$25,000
$75,000
$400,000
$500,000
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Contested
Without
Trial
18%
8%
6%
2%

NonContested
10%
3%
2%
1%

Figure 2. Rule 82(b)(1)’s schedule103

An understanding of each axis is required to arrive at the correct fee
award. The judgment amount axis is the more complicated of the two
because it is marginalized—bracketed akin to the Federal Income Tax104—
and regressive—decreasing in percentage as the judgment increases. As
the amount of the judgment increases from bracket to bracket, the
percentage of the overall award paid in fees decreases. For example,
compare the overall percentage of fee reimbursement between two clients
who win at trial: Client A wins $20,000, and Client B wins $200,000. The
attorney that wins Client A’s $20,000 case receives 20% of the judgment—
$4,000—as fees directly from the losing party. The award of $20,000 is
below the upper limit of the first bracket—$25,000—and the fee is
therefore assessed at the 20% rate. In comparison, the attorney that wins
Client B’s $200,000 case receives 11.25%—$22,500—as fees directly from
the losing party. The award of $200,000 is split between the first three
brackets. The first $25,000 is assessed at 20%, the next $75,000 is assessed
at 10%, and the remaining $100,000 of the award is assessed at 10%.
Assuming both clients employed counsel with a 30% contingency
arrangement, Client A still owes 10% of the judgment—$2,000—to her
attorney, while Client B still owes 18.75% of the judgment—$37,500—to
her attorney. As the amount of the judgment increases, the victorious
party owes a greater share of the award that was intended to compensate
her to her attorney.
The final bracket operates somewhat differently because it is open
ended. When the judgment is over $500,000, additional dollars are
assessed at the same percentage. As the judgment amount increases
beyond the highest bracket, the overall percentage received from the
losing party decreases asymptotically to the percentage assessed in that
bracket.105 Generally, as the award increases, the percentage of the Rule

103. Id.
104. 26 U.S.C. § 1.
105. This may be
lim
→

,

. (

,

)

expressed
= 10%.

as

Starting

the
with

following
the

first

limit
10%

equation:
bracket,
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82 fee award decreases toward the percentage specified in the final
bracket. This decrease in attorneys’ fees paid by the defeated party
correspondingly increases the share of attorneys’ fees that the prevailing
party must pay.

Figure 3. Proportions of prevailing party’s attorneys’ fees paid by each party under Rule
82(b)(1).

Unlike the judgment amount axis, the contestation axis is qualitative.
It sets out three schedules: one for when the matter was uncontested, one
for when the matter was contested, and one for when the case went to
trial.106 As the level of contestation increases from non-contested to
contested with trial, the percentage of Rule 82 fees increases.107 Thus,
prevailing parties that undergo a trial receive a higher percentage of fees
from their opponents than those who prevailed without a trial. Compare
three clients who each receive a $200,000 judgment. Client 1 has his
judgment entered by default, Client 2 faces opposition but secures her
victory in a summary judgment motion, and Client 3 takes their case to
trial. Under Rule 82, Client 1 receives 3.75% of his judgment, or $6,705.
Client 2 receives 8.25% of her judgment, or $16,500. Client 3 receives
11.75% of their judgment, or $22,500. In essence, the more effort required
by the party to prevail, the greater the percentage of Rule 82 fees.

,

. (

,

)

lim
= 10%
→
106. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(1).
107. Id.
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Figure 4. Proportion of judgment assessed to the non-prevailing party as fees.

2. Non-Monetary Judgments
In comparison to monetary judgments, which utilize the multi-axis
schedule of Rule 82(b)(1), there are only two options for non-monetary
judgments. When a non-monetary judgment is achieved without trial, the
prevailing party is entitled to twenty percent of its “actual attorney’s fees
which were necessarily incurred.”108 When a trial is required, the
prevailing party is entitled to thirty percent of its “actual attorney’s fees
which were necessarily incurred.”109 Unlike monetary judgments, which
are determined by the amount of the judgment, each Rule 82 motion for
fees from a non-monetary judgment requires an assessment of what fees
were necessarily incurred.110 As such, the court must assess the
reasonability of the party’s request, but reasonableness is untethered to
the amount of damages originally sought by the other party.111 Courts
require evidence to perform this reasonability analysis,112 and parties
submit either bills provided to clients or affidavits.113 Courts are given
discretion in the reasonability analysis, and decisions concerning these
fees are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.114 Overall, Rule
108. Id. 82(b)(2).
109. Id.
110. ATTORNEYS’ FEES 1995, supra note 17, at 59 (citing State v. Fairbanks N. Star
Borough Sch. Dist., 621 P.2d 1329, 1335 (Alaska 1981)).
111. Id. (citing Stevens v. Richardson, 755 P.2d 389, 396 (Alaska 1988)).
112. Id. at 60 (citing Hayes v. Xerox Corp., 718 P.2d 929, 939 (Alaska 1986)).
113. Id.
114. Wickwire v. Arctic Circle Air Servs., 722 P.2d 930, 935 (Alaska 1986)
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82 motions from non-monetary judgments are judicially more time
intensive than those from monetary judgments.115
3. Variance
Courts may depart from the base schedules of Rule 82(b) of their own
accord or at the request of one of the parties.116 Rule 82(b)(3) provides a
list of eleven factors that courts may consider.117 The final factor—”other
equitable factors deemed relevant”—is so open-ended that judges have
discretion to modify fees as they please.118 The Alaska Supreme Court has
stated that these factors are simply “a set of guidelines to aid the court in
making its decision” and that discretion lies with the trial judge.119
However, when trial judges determine that a variance is necessary, they
must explain the reasoning for the variance in writing.120
4. Rule 79
Rule 79 is a companion provision to Rule 82 because it allows the
prevailing party to recover costs and thus shifts some of the burden of
litigation. Unless otherwise directed by the court, Rule 79 grants
necessarily incurred costs to the prevailing party.121 Rule 79 is only
available upon filing and serving an itemized and verified cost bill within

(citing Stordahl v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 564 P.2d 63, 68 (Alaska 1977)).
115. ATTORNEYS’ FEES 1995, supra note 17, at 59.
116. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(3) (“The court may vary an attorney’s fee
award . . . if . . . the court determines a variation is warranted . . . .”); see also Di
Pietro & Carns, supra note 21, at 49–51 (discussing attorneys requesting variances).
Justice Rabinowitz dissented when the court added the variance factors because
he believed that “any attorney worth his or her salt will” request a variance and
thereby increase litigation over fees. ALASKA S. CT. ORDER NO. 1118 amended,
https://courts.alaska.gov/sco/docs/sco1118.pdf (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
117. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(3) (“The court may vary an attorney’s fee
award . . . upon consideration of . . . (A) the complexity of the litigation; (B) the
length of trial; (C) the reasonableness of the attorneys’ hourly rates and the
number of hours expended; (D) the reasonableness of the number of attorneys
used; (E) the attorneys’ efforts to minimize fees; (F) the reasonableness of the
claims and defenses pursued by each side; (G) vexatious or bad faith conduct; (H)
the relationship between the amount of work performed and the significance of
the matters at stake; (I) the extent to which a given fee award may be so onerous
to the non-prevailing party that it would deter similarly situated litigants from
the voluntary use of the courts; (J) the extent to which the fees incurred by the
prevailing party suggest that they had been influenced by considerations apart
from the case at bar, such as a desire to discourage claims by others against the
prevailing party or its insurer; and (K) other equitable factors deemed relevant.”).
118. Id.
119. Bishop v. Mun. of Anchorage, 899 P.2d 149, 156 (Alaska 1995). See Di
Pietro & Carns, supra note 21, for a rough discussion of the frequency of awards
and judicial modification.
120. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(3).
121. Id. 79.
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ten days of judgment.122 Rule 79(f)–(g) provides the lists of approved
costs.123 Some notable costs include filing fees, transcription fees, court
ordered security stipulations, and computerized legal research
expenses.124
5. Rule 68
Though not unique to Alaska,125 Rule 68 subverts the ordering of
Rule 82 and allows the non-prevailing party to become the prevailing
party.126 If, at any time prior to ten days before trial, a party makes an
offer to settle, the offer is not accepted, and the judgment is “at least 5
percent less favorable to the offeree than the offer,” the offeree “shall pay
all costs as allowed under the Civil Rules and shall pay reasonable actual
attorney’s fees incurred by the offeror from the date the offer was made”
pursuant to a fee schedule.127 The schedule varies the percentage of fees—
30 to 75% of “reasonable actual attorney’s fees”—based on when the offer
was made.128 Rule 68-eligible parties are entitled to the greater of Rule 68
fees or Rule 82 fees, but not both.129 By naming the Rule 68 eligible offeror
the “prevailing party” for the purposes of Rule 82, Rule 82 is functionally
inverted.
To explain how Rule 68 functions, take the example of a risk-seeking,
overly optimistic plaintiff and a generous but prescient defendant. At the
122. Id. 79(b).
123. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 79(f) provides the list of fees and ALASKA R. CIV. P. 79(g)
states that some travel costs are includable.
124. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 79(f).
125. See FED. R. CIV. P. 68 (granting post-offer costs to a losing party if they
made an offer more than fourteen days before trial, that offer was rejected, and
the amount of the judgment was less than the amount of the offer).
126. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68.
127. Id. 68(b).
128. Id. The table below excerpts and organizes the Rule 68 schedule:
Conditions
Percentage of
Provision
Reasonable Actual
Attorneys’ Fees
ALASKA R. CIV. P.
“[O]ffer was served no later than 75%
68(b)(1)
60 days after the date established
in the pretrial order for initial
disclosures”
ALASKA R. CIV. P.
“[O]ffer was served more than 60 50%
68(b)(2)
days after the date established in
the pretrial order for initial
disclosures . . . but more than 90
days before the trial began”
ALASKA R. CIV. P.
“[O]ffer was served 90 days or less 30%
68(b)(3)
but more than 10 days before the
trial began”
Figure 5. Rule 68 reasonable actual attorneys’ fees schedule.
129. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68(c).
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outset of litigation, the plaintiff believes his injuries are worth $100,000.
Two days after initial disclosures, the defendant believes herself to be
liable for $50,000 worth of harm caused to the plaintiff. To avoid the costs
of mounting a defense and the increased fees associated with higher levels
of contestation in Rule 82, the defendant makes an offer of $60,000
exclusive—$67,300 inclusive—of Rule 82 attorneys’ fees.130 The plaintiff
rejects the offer, the case goes to trial, and the jury awards the plaintiff
$50,000. Because the award was more than 5% less than $60,000, the
plaintiff is on the hook for 75% of defendant’s post offer attorneys’ fees,
among other costs. The defendant incurred $20,000 in attorneys’ fees,131
and 90% of these fees—$18,000—were incurred after rejection of the offer.
Defendant pays plaintiff $36,500, which is equal to $50,000 less 75% of
$18,000. The defendant’s total cost of the litigation and defense was
$56,500.132 Without Rule 68, the defendant would have spent $77,500 on
the litigation after paying her own attorney $20,000 and the plaintiff’s
Rule 82 fees of $7,500. Under Rule 68, and assuming a one-third
contingency fee, plaintiff would take home $24,333.46 of the original
$50,000 judgment.133 Intended to encourage settlement,134 Rule 68 inverts
the typical Rule 82 relationship between the prevailing party and the
defeated party, granting attorneys’ fees at a special rate schedule.
B. Purposes of Rule 82
The Alaska Supreme Court primarily defines the purposes and
function of Rule 82.135 Unlike the legislature, the Alaska Supreme Court
provides little in the way of contemporaneous statements of intent.136
However, the court does speak to its intent through its subsequent judicial
opinions. The court has suggested that Rule 82 is intended to provide
130. See ATTORNEYS’ FEES 1995, supra note 17, at 117–18 for a discussion of Rule
68 strategy.
131. For the sake of argument, the attorney expended eighty hours on the
defense and billed at a rate of $250 per hour. For a rudimentary list of average
hourly fees by state, see How Much Do Lawyers Cost: Fees Broken Down by State,
CONTRACTSCOUNSEL (Aug. 17, 2021),
https://www.contractscounsel.com/b/how-much-do-lawyers-cost.
132. Defendant paid his attorney $20,000 and paid Plaintiff $36,500.
133. Plaintiff paid $12,166.54 to his attorney, about one third of $36,500.
134. Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 21, at 48 (citing Miklautsch v. Dominick, 452
P.2d 438 (Alaska 1969)).
135. See id. at 41–46 (overviewing the history of Rule 82).
136. See, e.g., ALASKA S. CT. ORDER NO. 497,
https://courts.alaska.gov/sco/docs/sco497.pdf (providing no indication of the
court’s intent). But see ALASKA S. CT. ORDER NO. 1118 amended,
https://courts.alaska.gov/sco/docs/sco1118.pdf (providing indication of intent
to maintain current case law and a dissent questioning the need for the updated
rule).
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partial compensation, discourage frivolous suit, dissuade bad conduct,
encourage settlement, and help avoid protracted litigation.137
The Alaska Supreme Court views Rule 82 as a vehicle for partial
rather than full remuneration of fees. Granting full fees would punish
parties for “good faith” litigation.138 Parties typically do not know who
will win when they enter litigation,139 and paying full fees would
discourage them from airing grievances in the courts. As such, granting
full fees by default would limit access to the courts.140 Partial fees that are
too large may also have this effect, and this realization prompted the court
to amend Rule 82 to include the Rule 82(b)(3) variance factors and the
Rule 82(b)(2) schedule for non-monetary judgments.141 Overall, the court
wants to provide compensation without hindering access to justice.142
Though the court does not want to punish good faith litigation, Rule
82 is intended to discourage frivolous suits and bad faith litigation.143
When parties behave poorly, the court can drop the hammer of Rule 82
and require full compensation of attorneys’ fees or deny fees to the
winning party.144 However, the court has not stated whether the award of
full fees is to punish the misbehaving party or to compensate its victim.145
In conjunction with Rule 68, Rule 82 is intended to shorten litigation
and encourage settlement.146 Without Rule 68, Rule 82 would be
antithetical to this end because its percentage award increases with the

137. ATTORNEYS’ FEES 1995, supra note 17, at 52–55.
138. Malvo v. J. C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 587 (Alaska 1973).
139. Andrew Kleinfeld, On Shifting Attorneys’ Fees in Alaska: A Rebuttal, 24
JUDGES’ J. 39, 41 (1985) (“Attorneys’ fee awards imply that the loser should have
recognized that the winner was right, and not fought the claim. The implication
is often unfair in contract (and tort) claims where considerable justice can be found
on both sides.”).
140. Id.
141. State v. Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 406 (Alaska 2007).
142. Id.
143. See Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 21, at 37 (stating that legislatures in the
United States use fee shifting as a punitive measure to reduce frivolous and bad
faith litigation); see also Kordziel, supra note 22, at 456 (noting that while the
purpose of Alaska’s Rule 82 is to punish bad faith claims and defenses, fee shifting
is not the optimal measure to achieve this end).
144. ATTORNEYS’ FEES 1995, supra note 17, at 53–54. See id. at 53 nn.269–71 for
examples of Alaska cases where such action was taken.
145. Id. at 53–54 (citing Tobeluk v. Lind, 589 P.2d 873, 876 (Alaska 1979) and
Williams v. Eckert, 643 P.2d 991, 997 (Alaska 1982) for the principle that Rule 82 is
compensatory and remedial).
146. See Miklautsch v. Dominick, 452 P.2d 438, 441 (Alaska 1969) (“The
purpose of Civil Rule 68 is to encourage the settlement of civil litigation, as well
as to avoid protracted litigation.”); see also Cont’l Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 552 P.2d 1122 (Alaska 1976) (highlighting the court’s intent that Rule 68 fees
be tailored toward inducing settlement).
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contestation level.147 As such, Rule 82 incentivizes a party that has the
upper hand to increase the contestation level so as to pay a lower
percentage of its attorneys’ fees. Rule 68 provides strong incentives for
settlement, by punishing parties that continue litigation after receiving a
settlement offer that was better than the ultimate award. Rule 68 increases
uncertainty and in doing so encourages settlement.
C. History of Rule 82 as a Guide for Change
A look back at Rule 82’s history will be helpful in looking forward to
crafting meaningful change. Fee shifting in Alaska has a longer history
than the state itself, but the retention of Alaska’s modified English Rule is
likely more the product of “historical accident” than a conscious rejection
of the American Rule.148 This Section briefly summarizes the history of
Rule 82 to show the agents of its change across time and to highlight
potential vectors of future change.149
Congress originated fee shifting in Alaska, albeit in a roundabout
fashion, in 1844 when it declared that the laws of Oregon would apply in
the territory.150 For much of the period between 1900 and Alaska’s
admission as a state, Congress promulgated rules, which it failed to later
repeal, that maintained fee shifting in Alaska.151
Following Alaska’s admission as a state in 1959, the Alaska Supreme
Court promulgated the first iteration of Rule 82 as part of its rules of civil
procedure.152 The court did so in accordance with its constitutionally
granted power to promulgate procedural rules.153 In 1962, the Alaska
State Legislature repealed and replaced the code of civil procedure and
granted the Alaska Supreme Court the authority to promulgate rules on
fee-shifting under Alaska Statute section 09.60.010.154 The Alaska
Supreme Court modified Rule 82 seventeen times between 1959 and
2021155 and resisted the Alaska bar’s several transitory campaigns to
147. Miklautsch, 452 P.2d at 441.
148. ATTORNEYS’ FEES 1995, supra note 17, at 29.
149. See id. at 29–44 for a full discussion of Rule 82’s history with sources.
150. Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 21, at 38–39.
151. ATTORNEYS’ FEES 1995, supra note 17, at 32.
152. Id. at 34.
153. See ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15 (“The supreme court . . . shall make and
promulgate rules governing practice and procedure in civil and criminal cases in
all courts.”); see also State v. Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 401 (Alaska
2007) (“Rule 82 is procedural and was promulgated under the power to make
rules vested in this court by the constitution.”).
154. ATTORNEYS’ FEES 1995, supra note 17, at 34–35 (quoting § 5.14, 1962 Alaska
Sess. Laws ch. 101).
155. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82. See ATTORNEYS’ FEES 1995, supra note 17, at 35–39 for
a discussion of some of these changes.
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repeal the rule.156 One of these modifications came in 1993 at the behest of
a committee formed to review Rule 82.157 In an attempt to create parity
between plaintiffs and defendants, the court adopted fixed percentages
for non-monetary judgments to approximate the fee schedule for
plaintiffs.158 Over the dissent of Justice Rabinowitz, who feared a rise in
litigation over fees,159 the court also adopted its eleven Rule 82(f) variance
factors to combat the access to justice and due process issues that may
arise from excessive attorneys’ fees.160
Throughout much of Rule 82’s history, the legislature left the court
to its own devices. However, the two bodies butted heads in 2003 when
the legislature passed House Bill (HB) 145 to abrogate a judicially created
common law doctrine of one-way fee shifting for public interest
litigants.161 The superior court held that the bill was unconstitutional
because it overturned a rule of practice and procedure without a twothirds vote of each house of the legislature as required by article IV section
15 of the Alaska Constitution.162 Further, the superior court held that the
bill violated due process and equal protection by restricting access to
courts.163 The Alaska Supreme Court held Rule 82 to be procedural rather
than substantive and held that it was promulgated under the court’s
constitutionally granted powers rather than under section 09.60.010 of the
Alaska Statutes.164 However, the court held HB 145 constitutional, as it
overruled judicially created substantive law.165 Further, the court held
that HB 145 did not present due process or access to justice concerns so
long as the court retains the ability to utilize its Rule 82(f) factors on a
case-by-case basis.166
Both the Alaska Supreme Court and the Alaska legislature can alter
Rule 82. In relevant part, the Alaska Constitution reads:
The supreme court shall make and promulgate rules governing
the administration of all courts. It shall make and promulgate
rules governing practice and procedure in civil and criminal

156. ATTORNEYS’ FEES 1995, supra note 17, at 36–37.
157. Id. at 38.
158. Id. at 38–39.
159. ALASKA S. CT. ORDER NO. 1118 amended,
https://courts.alaska.gov/sco/docs/sco1118.pdf (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
160. ATTORNEYS’ FEES 1995, supra note 17, at 37–38.
161. For the bill and its contents, see H.R. 145, 23d Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2003),
http://www.akleg.gov/PDF/23/Bills/HB0145A.PDF.
162. Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk v. State, No. 1JU-03-700CI, 2004 WL 5190042
(Alaska Super. Ct. Apr. 6, 2004).
163. Id.
164. State v. Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 401 (Alaska 2007).
165. Id. at 404.
166. Id. at 406.
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cases in all courts. These rules may be changed by the legislature
by two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house.167
Thus, the Alaska State Legislature may change Rule 82 only with the
approval of a supermajority of both houses. However, it may pass
substantive fee shifting statutes that promote public policy and favor
either plaintiffs or defendants by simple majority vote.168 The Alaska
Supreme Court retains the ability to alter Rule 82 in “policy neutral” ways
that do not preference either plaintiffs or defendants.

IV. ALTERING RULE 82
The Alaska Supreme Court intends Rule 82 and its companions to
perform a number of functions and to maintain parity between plaintiffs
and defendants while doing so.169 While the rule and its companions are
facially neutral, they preference defendants and comparatively
undercompensate plaintiffs. Notably, plaintiffs are typically limited to
recovery of a percentage of the judgment, while defendants may recover
a percentage of their actual fees.170 Thus, plaintiffs’ fee awards are limited
by the value of the suit, while there is no such limit for defendants. Either
the Alaska Supreme Court or the legislature should amend Rule 82 to
permit plaintiffs the same recovery as defendants and place a cap on
attorneys’ fees recoverable under the rule.
A. The Problem
Rule 82(b)(1) and Rule 82(b)(2) appear to provide similar levels of
compensation, but, functionally, they do not. The Rule 82(b)(2) nonmonetary judgment fee schedule is ostensibly designed to approximate
Rule 82(b)(1)’s monetary judgment fee schedule.171 Rule 82(b)(1)
asymptotes to 10% of judgments in cases that go to trial, which, assuming
a one-third contingency fee, is 30% of the plaintiff’s total attorneys’ fees.172
Rule 82(b)(2) grants 30% of reasonable attorneys’ fees when trial is
167. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15.
168. See Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 403 (noting the existence of
statutes promulgated by the legislature that contain substantive fee-shifting
provisions to promote public policy by preferencing either plaintiffs or
defendants).
169. See Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 21, at 46 (“The Civil Rules Subcommittee
suggested these [1993 amendments to Rule 82] . . . to equalize the recovery
available between plaintiffs and defendants in certain cases.”).
170. See supra Section III.A.
171. See Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 21, at 46 (noting the intent of the Civil
Rules Subcommittee).
172. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(1).
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necessary.173 The two rules look functionally identical, as they both yield
approximately 30% of attorneys’ fees. Despite this seeming parity, Rule
82(b)(1) and Rule 82(b)(2) are apples and oranges: categorically similar
but functionally different.

Figure 6. Comparison of percentage of fees paid by the defeated party under Rule 82(b)(1)
(left) and Rule 82(b)(2) (right).

While plaintiffs and defendants could theoretically take advantage
of either Rule 82(b)(1) or Rule 82(b)(2),174 plaintiffs—seeking damages—
primarily make use of Rule 82(b)(1), and defendants—seeking
dismissal—primarily make use of Rule 82(b)(2). Parity generally requires
that one-third of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees are equal to one-third of
defendants’ attorneys’ fees. However, because plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees
are measured differently than defendants’ fees, the two are likely to be
unequal.
Take the example of a suit for $25,000 that goes to trial and requires
$20,000 of attorney time to defend.175 If the plaintiff is victorious, she is
173. Id. 82(b)(2).
174. For example, a plaintiff could seek injunctive relief, and a defendant could
file a counterclaim for damages.
175. This is not unreasonable for a representation that requires a total of 100
hours of attorney time billed at a reasonable rate of $250 per hour. See How Much
Do Lawyers Cost: Fees Broken Down by State, supra note 131 (listing average attorney
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entitled to 20% of the judgment, $5,000, as attorneys’ fees.176 If the
defendant is victorious, she is entitled to 30% of her reasonable attorneys’
fees, or $6,000.177 Defendants’ hourly fees can quickly overwhelm the
value of the suit, but plaintiffs are limited by the value of the suit. This
inequity has not been lost on commentators,178 but none has fully
explored a solution.
B. The Solution
The Alaska Supreme Court or the Alaska State Legislature by twothirds majority should promulgate a new version of Rule 82(b)(2) that
allows the prevailing party to collect a percentage of reasonably incurred
attorneys’ fees irrespective of judgment type. Further, the promulgating
body should establish a set of bracketed ceilings on the percentage of fees
collectable at the hourly rate under Rule 82(b)(2) that is pegged to the
value of the suit as pled.
1. Rule 82(b)(2) Expansion
To create parity between plaintiffs and defendants, Rule 82(b)(2)
should be modified so that all prevailing parties in contested proceedings
or at trial can receive a percentage of their reasonable attorneys’ fees. In
cases where there is a monetary judgment, the prevailing party should
have the right to choose between Rule 82(b)(1) and Rule 82(b)(2). Thus,
where available, prevailing parties would choose between the Rule
82(b)(1)-determined percentage of the judgment and the Rule 82(b)(2)determined percentage of reasonable attorneys’ fees.179 The promulgating
body should leave the current schedule of Rule 82(b)(2) in place. Parties
that prevail without any contestation should be limited to the schedule of
Rule 82(b)(1).

costs in Alaska as between $150 and $300 per hour).
176. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(1).
177. See id. 82(b)(2).
178. See Kordziel, supra note 22, at 449 (noting that Rule 82 “institutionalize[s]
inequitable fee awards favoring defendants”); see also Di Pietro & Carns, supra
note 21, at 46 n.60 (recognizing that attorneys are unsatisfied with the inequities
that remain in the reimbursement of plaintiffs and defendants); See, e.g.,
ATTORNEYS’ FEES 1995, supra note 17, at 148–49 (noting objections to the current
regime and potential changes).
179. The lodestar method should be used to determine reasonable fees. See
LAYCOCK & HASEN, supra note 6, at 937–38 for a discussion of the lodestar and how
to calculate it. The lodestar is the market rate for attorneys of comparable skill and
experience in the relevant type of litigation multiplied by the number of hours
worked. Id.
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2. Rule 82(b)(2) Ceiling
While the variance factors allow judges to reduce extreme awards,
the possibility of excessive attorneys’ fee awards is nonetheless a specter
hanging over Rule 82(b)(2). A cap on fees chargeable to the non-prevailing
party mitigates this concern for both plaintiffs and defendants. Although
this Note proposes a specific, graduated schedule capping attorneys’ fee
awards according to the value of suits as pled, the promulgating body
could implement this cap structure with amended values or implement
an entirely different cap structure, as it chooses.180
The ceiling should have three brackets. For suits with pled values of
$0.01 to $1,000, the cap on attorneys’ fee awards should be $1,000. For
suits with pled values of $1,000 to $3,000, the cap should match dollar for
dollar. And for suits with pled values above $3,000, the cap should be
$2,100, plus 30% of the value of the suit as pled. In effect, as suits with
pled values increase beyond $3,000, the cap decreases from 100% of the
pled value to 30% of the pled value. The promulgating body should
preserve the power of the Rule 82(b)(3) variance factors, which allow
judges to increase or decrease awards as equity demands. Retaining these
factors creates a presumptive cap but allows for variance for good reason.
The cap on the amount of attorneys’ fees collectible by the prevailing
party is represented by the following schedule:
Amount of Suit as Pled (including
counterclaims)
$0.01 to $1,000
$1,000 to $3,000
$3,000 and above

Maximum Amount of Attorneys’
Fee Award
$1,000
The amount of the suit as pled.
$2,100, plus the amount of the
suit as pled multiplied by threetenths.

Figure 7. Proposed cap on attorneys’ fees assessable to the defeated party.

180. The values were selected to illustrate a possible structure and to avoid
cliff effects.
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Figure 8. Proposed ceiling as a function of the amount of the suit as pled (bottom) and
maximum proportion of suit as pled returned as attorneys’ fee award (top).

3. Function
To help understand the proposed rule changes, consider a plaintiff
who pleads damages of $100,000 and ultimately wins a verdict of
$100,000, after 100 hours of work by a mid-level attorney who could
charge $250 per hour. Had the plaintiff’s attorney not been working on a
contingency basis, the plaintiff would owe her attorney $25,000, for 100
hours of work at $250 per hour. At this juncture, the plaintiff’s attorney
would submit a Rule 82 motion for the higher of $12,500—the amount due
under the schedule in Rule 82(b)(1)—and $7,500—30% of the plaintiff’s
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reasonable attorneys’ fees, which amounted to $25,000. In this scenario,
plaintiff’s counsel did not expend enough hours to earn a higher rate
under the new rule. If, however, plaintiff’s counsel expended 200 hours
on the suit, for a total value of $50,000, the new rule would grant plaintiff
$15,000—$2,500 more than the Rule 82(b)(1) rate. If, instead, the
defendant won, she would receive one-third of her actual, reasonable
attorneys’ fees. However, neither party would be able to receive more
than $32,100 in attorneys’ fees, no matter how many hours expended.
4. Effects
These proposed rule changes have a number of benefits. By allowing
plaintiffs and defendants to recover under the same method, the modified
rule creates better parity between plaintiffs and defendants than currently
exists. Further, the changes better compensate plaintiffs, incentivize
attorneys to accept meritorious low-value suits, and reduce uncertainty
for plaintiffs and defendants.
Ideally, our judicial system would bring plaintiffs to the position
they occupied prior to the harm that occurred. The current rules in Alaska
attempt to create parity by allowing plaintiffs and defendants to collect
roughly 30% of their attorneys’ fees from the defeated party.181 However,
because plaintiffs and defendants calculate fees differently, there is no
real parity. Allowing plaintiffs’ attorneys and defense counsel to collect
30% of the cost of their labor from the defeated party evens the playing
field by putting the same emphasis on defense and plaintiff lawyers’
labor. The proposed rule refocuses on the hours expended by plaintiffs’
attorneys in the same way that the current rule focuses on hours
expended by defense counsel. Doing so allows plaintiffs to gain the
benefit of their attorneys’ labor. Low-value cases aside, the proposed rule
does not increase the amount plaintiffs’ attorneys receive, but it does shift
the burden of the attorneys’ labor and incentivizes efficient defense
practice. Rather than burying plaintiffs in documents and motions, the
defense is incentivized to cooperate with plaintiff’s counsel to increase
efficiency.
The proposed rule also provides an incentive for plaintiffs’ attorneys
to take high-merit, low-value cases while maintaining the incentive to
reject low-merit, low-value claims.182 By allowing plaintiffs’ attorneys to
recover more than would traditionally be allowed under contingency
arrangements, attorneys are encouraged to bring meritorious, low-value

181. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(1)–(2).
182. Plaintiffs’ attorneys still shoulder the risk of not being paid and will
therefore not accept cases of low merit. Further, ALASKA R. CIV. P. 11 and 77(j)
allow judges to sanction attorneys for vexatious and frivolous conduct.
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suits that would have been uneconomical otherwise. Take the example of
a plaintiff with $10,000 in damages, a one-third contingency arrangement,
and a reasonable but not absolute chance of victory. Under the current
rules, few plaintiffs’ attorneys would be willing to take this case knowing
that it could require a trial. If the plaintiff prevails, the attorneys’ fees
would be only $3,333.33. This is the rough equivalent of thirteen hours at
$250 per hour. The risk of loss further decreases the value of the suit to
plaintiffs’ attorneys, who are out of pocket for their expenses and time
spent in the event of defeat. The hours spent on low-value claims can
quickly overwhelm the value of the claim. Thus, the risk-to-reward ratio,
despite being in the plaintiff’s favor, is not great enough to encourage
attorneys to take the case. Defense attorneys are not subject to this
limitation because they are paid by the hour and compensated win or
lose. Further, defense costs are essentially partially subsidized by Rule
82(b)(2).183 Thus, plaintiffs’ attorneys rather than plaintiffs themselves
need incentivization to take low-value, high-merit cases.
For a $10,000 suit, the proposed changes would allow plaintiffs’
attorneys to earn up to $5,100 rather than $3,333.33 in fees. However, to
earn this amount, plaintiffs’ attorneys would need to perform $17,000
worth of work. Plaintiffs would choose Rule 82(b)(2) over Rule 82(b)(1)
once their attorney had performed $6,666.66 of legal work, the equivalent
of twenty-six hours at $250 per hour, at which point the rule would award
$3,333.33 in fees. From $6,666.66 to $11,111.11 in legal fees, calculated
hourly, there is no actual increase in the fee that the plaintiff’s attorney
would receive, since the amount awarded under the new rule would not
exceed the amount that the attorney would receive under the contingency
fee arrangement. Above this amount, but below the cap, each additional
hour of work increases the plaintiff’s attorney’s take-home pay by threetenths of the value of that time. This method encourages plaintiffs’
attorneys to remain diligent by paying them, albeit at a lower rate, for
their labor.
While the proposed rules could arguably foster inefficiency, bill
padding, and increased pleading amounts, there are safeguards in place
to prevent these outcomes. Judges still retain the authority to alter fee
awards using the Rule 82(f) variance factors, and timesheets would be
scrutinized by opposing counsel. Additionally, these actions are ethics
violations.184 Currently, plaintiffs have incentives to inflate damages at
183. Given that defendants will pay attorneys’ fees to their counsel win or lose,
their attorneys’ fees are subsidized by the percentage likelihood of victory
multiplied by the Rule 82(b)(2) fee award.
184. See ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.5 (stating that for a fee to be
reasonable it must correctly evaluate the time and skill required); see also id. 8.4
(proscribing dishonesty).
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the pleadings stage. Outside of evidentiary limitations, the primary check
on damage amounts is credibility with judges and fact finders. Pleading
higher damages increases plaintiffs’ bargaining positions and anchors
both negotiations and jury deliberations.185 Rule 68 may eliminate some
puffery, but it does not apply to pleadings, and it is a relatively crude tool
in helping defendants obtain information about how plaintiffs truly value
the suit.186 Because the proposed rule changes limit plaintiffs’ risk to
roughly three-tenths of the amount of the case as pled, the rule changes
provide additional incentive to plead accurately and not exaggerate
pleadings. While the amount that plaintiffs could receive under the rule
is also limited, overcoming the amount awarded by Rule 82(b)(1) becomes
increasingly difficult as the value of the case increases.
The proposed rule changes reduce uncertainty for plaintiffs and for
defendants. Under the current rules, there is no limit on the attorneys’
fees a losing plaintiff may be forced to pay. Allowing plaintiffs to recover
in the same way as defendants and imposing a cap does not eliminate
uncertainty, but it reduces it by limiting the amount of fees that can be
recovered. For plaintiffs, their maximum liability is limited to three-tenths
of the amount pled. The same is true for defendants. Further, the cap
limits the amount of attorneys’ fees that can be collected under Rule
82(b)(1) as a result of punitive damage awards, mitigating the concern of
overbearing fee awards as a result of punitive damages.
While the proposed rule is balanced, it may meet resistance. It is
possible that it would upset both the plaintiffs’ bar and the defense bar
because it is not overly conciliatory to either. Prior studies have examined
attorney feelings towards Rule 82 and concluded that the rule is
acceptable as is.187 These studies based their results on attorney
perceptions of Rule 82 as a proxy for how well the rule actually
accomplishes its goals.188 This perception-based proxy is crude at best.
However, serious practical and theoretical difficulties hinder the creation
and implementation of a study of the efficacy of the rule itself. Given these
difficulties, prior studies concluded attorney perception was the best
alternative.189
185. See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation
Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 138 (1994) (describing
anchoring).
186. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68.
187. See, e.g., ATTORNEYS’ FEES 1995, supra note 17, at 143–44, 147–49
(concluding that most lawyers like the rule and suggesting only “limited
changes”); NANCY MEADE, ATTORNEY’S FEE SHIFTING: PERCEPTIONS ON ITS IMPACT IN
ALASKA 9, 43 (2012) (following up on ATTORNEYS’ FEES 1995, supra note 17, and
finding the general takeaway to be “it ain’t broke so don’t fix it”).
188. MEADE, supra note 187, at 52.
189. Id. at 51–52 (summarizing why it is difficult to design a study that
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One problem with these studies is that they did not report results
based on the type of work each attorney performed. Though many
attorneys reported working as both plaintiff and defense counsel,190 a
breakdown of constituency would aid in understanding underlying
biases that may have altered the data. Further, the method of data
collection could have resulted in skewed results. Attorneys likely
responded to the email survey without combing through their records to
ensure that their responses were accurate. Further, not all attorneys are
similarly situated. A full-time plaintiffs’ attorney at a firm that works on
hundreds of cases a year likely has a different opinion than does someone
who performs little plaintiffs’ work or who has never truly practiced.191 A
longer-term, more rigorous quantitative study is needed to accurately
gauge the effects of Rule 82.
While these studies may not be determinative, they do provide some
anecdotal data. Notably, some attorneys took issue with judgment-proof
plaintiffs,192 others with defense “milk[ing]” fees,193 and others still with
institutional defendants using Rule 68 as a “club” against middle-income
plaintiffs.194 At least one attorney feared changes similar to those
proposed and wrote, “A lawyer working on a contingency fee should not
be able to change his/her fee agreement to hourly to punish the opposing
party. An award of fees should be the actual fees the attorney would
receive and not some hypothetical number.”195 Comments like these may
reflect the feelings of some attorneys in practice.
At the end of the day, however, the focus should be on achieving
clients’ goals and creating a system that is fundamentally fair. While
attorneys’ views are important, they are not the touchstone of this system.

V. CONCLUSION
While designed to create parity, the current version of Rule 82
divides how it compensates litigants along plaintiff-defendant lines.
Plaintiffs are limited to a percentage of the judgment while defendants
receive a portion of their actual, reasonable attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs are
thus subject to extreme uncertainty, as there is no limit on the defense’s
recoverable fees. There is no equivalent risk to defendants. This disparity
examines the effects of Rule 82); see also ATTORNEYS’ FEES, supra note 17, at 144–45.
190. MEADE, supra note 187, at 82.
191. See id. at 87 (providing an example of a respondent who could not answer
a survey question because they were a law clerk and did not have experience in
practice).
192. Id. at 83.
193. Id. at 85.
194. Id. at 110.
195. Id. at 102.
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can be solved by allowing plaintiffs to recover in the same manner as
defendants and placing a cap on recoverable fees. Doing so creates better
parity, decreases uncertainty, and has the potential to more adequately
compensate plaintiffs. Further, it increases the incentive to bring highmerit, low-value suits that would not otherwise be attractive to plaintiffs’
attorneys.

